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Psychopathy is a personality disorder frequently associated with immoral behaviors.
Previous behavioral studies on the influence of psychopathy on moral decision have
yielded contradictory results, possibly because they focused either on judgment (abstract
evaluation) or on choice of hypothetical action, two processes that may rely on different
mechanisms. In this study, we explored the influence of the level of psychopathic
traits on judgment and choice of hypothetical action during moral dilemma evaluation.
A population of 102 students completed a questionnaire with ten moral dilemmas and
nine non-moral dilemmas. The task included questions targeting both judgment (“Is it
acceptable to . . . in order to . . . ?”) and choice of hypothetical action (“Would you . . . in
order to . . . ?”). The level of psychopathic traits of each participant was evaluated with
the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy (LSRP) scale. Logistic regression fitted with the
generalized estimating equations method analyses were conducted using responses to
the judgment and choice tasks as the dependent variables and psychopathy scores as
predictor. Results show that a high level of psychopathic traits, and more specifically those
related to affective deficit, predicted a greater proportion of utilitarian responses for the
choice but not for the judgment question. There was no first-order interaction between
the level of psychopathic traits and other potential predictors. The relation between a
high level of psychopathic traits and increased utilitarianism in choice of action but not
in moral judgment may explain the contradictory results of previous studies where these
two processes were not contrasted. It also gives further support to the hypothesis that
choice of action endorsement and abstract judgment during moral dilemma evaluation
are partially distinct neural and psychological processes. We propose that this distinction
should be better taken into account in the evaluation of psychopathic behaviors.
Keywords: moral, psychopathy, decision making, judgment, choice, emotion
INTRODUCTION
Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterized by emo-
tional dysfunction, callousness, manipulativeness, reduced guilt,
remorse and empathy, egocentricity, and antisocial behavior
including impulsivity and poor behavioral control. Moreover,
psychopaths frequently engage in morally inappropriate behav-
ior, including taking advantage of others, lying, cheating, and
abandoning relationships (Cleckley, 1941; Hare, 1999). Although
psychopathy increases the probability of immoral behavior,
experimental studies exploring its influence on decision mak-
ing during moral dilemma evaluation have yielded contradictory
results. Some studies report that psychopathy does not influence
the decision (Blair, 1995; Glenn et al., 2009; Tassy et al., 2009;
Cima et al., 2010) while others report that it is associated with
higher probability of responses that favor the sacrifice of one
individual for the greater welfare of many (i.e., utilitarian bias)
(Glenn et al., 2010; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Koenigs et al.,
2012). This latter result is consistent with the idea suggesting
that emotion is a key element leading to non-utilitarian moral
judgments and hence that individuals with low emotional respon-
siveness, such as those high in psychopathy, are expected to make
more utilitarian judgment (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985; Greene
et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007). It is also consistent with the
proposal that psychopathy tends to reduce the empathy for the
victim, leading to greater concern for the mathematically ratio-
nal ends than the emotionally aversive dimension (Greene et al.,
2004, 2008; Crockett et al., 2010). Based on clinical experience,
several authors have also reported that psychopaths are individ-
uals with normal—or even higher—intelligence and a normal
ability to judge, but whose actual behaviors remain particularly
immoral (Cleckley, 1941; Hare, 1999; Glenn et al., 2010). This
discrepancy between the intact ability to judge and an altered
behavior suggests that these processes are at least partially inde-
pendent, as proposed in the case of patients with ventromedial
prefrontal brain lesions who exhibit inappropriate social behav-
iors but a preserved judgment ability (Eslinger and Damasio,
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1985). Somewhat counter-intuitively, moral choice of action as
reflected in actual behavior could thus be independent of moral
judgment. Recent behavioral studies support such discrepancy by
reporting experimental evidence for a divergence between judg-
ment and choice of action during moral evaluation (Kurzban
et al., 2012; Tassy et al., 2013). Moreover, moral choice of action
and moral judgment could rely on partially distinct neural pro-
cesses. A support to this hypothesis comes from results of a recent
study showing that neural disruption before moral dilemma
evaluation alters the judgment (objective evaluation) without
modifying the subsequent choice of action (Tassy et al., 2012).
Psychopathy has traditionally been conceptualized in foren-
sic samples. It describes a subset of individuals with Antisocial
Personality Disorder who exhibit distinct personality features.
However, recent taxometric studies suggest that psychopathy is
a dimensional construct rather than a qualitatively distinct cate-
gory of behavior and should be considered as an extreme variant
of normal personality (Levenson et al., 1995; Hare and Neumann,
2005; Walton et al., 2008). The level of psychopathic traits would
thus exist on a continuum in the general population and individ-
ual differences can be reliably assessed via self-report measures
(Lilienfeld and Andrews, 1996; Edens et al., 2006). In the present
study we seek to determine if a high level of psychopathic traits,
in particular those related to primary psychopathy characterized
by affective deficits (Karpman, 1946) and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFc) hypoactivation (Lotze et al., 2007), may be asso-
ciated to an utilitarian preference in the specific case of moral
choice during moral dilemma evaluation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PSYCHOPATHY SCALE
The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy (LSRP) scale is the only
global measure of psychopathic traits in the general popula-
tion validated in French (Levenson et al., 1995; Chabrol and
Leichsenring, 2006; Campbell et al., 2009). It consists of self-
administered questionnaires with 26 items in a 1–4 Likert-type
agree/disagree rating scale. This scale is further subdivided into
two subscales.
The LSRP1 is a subset of 16 items from the complete question-
naire constructed to determine the degree to which participants
report interpersonal-affective characteristics that are associated
with factor I of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) and
that are the hallmark of primary Psychopathy based on Cleckley’s
and Hare’s conceptualizations of the disorder (1, 2). The 10
remaining items compose the LSRP2, which measures the traits
related to the social deviance associated with the factor II of the
Hare Psychopathy Checklist.
DILEMMAS
We presented 10 moral and 9 non-moral dilemmas validated and
used in a previous rTMS experiment (Tassy et al., 2012). Most
of the dilemmas were directly inspired from the battery devel-
oped by Greene et al. (2001), translated and adapted to take
into account cultural specificities. All were “Sacrificial” moral
dilemmas, offering the opportunity to save many people from
death (or serious physical consequence) at the cost of one per-
son’s life (or serious physical consequences) (Glenn et al., 2010)
(e.g., Deadly fumes are rising up in the portion of a hospital
where 53 patients are located. Thanks to the ventilation system
you can divert the fumes to a room where one patient is sleep-
ing. Is it acceptable to divert the fumes to the room where one
patient is sleeping to prevent asphyxiation of 53 patients? Do you
divert the fumes to the room where one patient is sleeping to pre-
vent asphyxiation of 53 patients?). Each question was worded so
that a positive response favored the survival of the highest num-
ber of people (utilitarian response). The non-moral dilemmas
required decision making in simple contextual situations with no
moral connotation whatsoever. “Appropriate” responses implied
the maximization of beneficial overall consequences (e.g., You
have to be at a very important meeting at 14 h. You can get there
by car or subway. With the subway you will arrive just in time for
your meeting. With the car you travel in a more enjoyable way
but you will arrive late. Is it acceptable to use the subway instead
of your car to be on time at the meeting? Do you use the subway
instead of your car to be on time at the meeting?). Because psy-
chopathy is associated to selfishness (Hare, 1999; Mokros et al.,
2008), we tested if increasing the personal consequences of the
decision would interact with psychopathy traits (Thomas et al.,
2011). To do so, in five moral dilemma, the potential victim was
supposed to be a family member of the subject (e.g., A train with
no brakes is running toward 12 workers. You can divert the train
by operating a switch, but it will then go on another track where
your cousin is working.).
Two questions followed the text of each dilemma: one targeting
judgment (“Is it acceptable to . . . in order to . . . ?”) and one target-
ing choice of action1 (“Would you . . . in order to . . . ?”). To control
for any order effect, two types of questionnaires were created: one
where the judgment question preceded choice (“Order A” ques-
tionnaire), and one where the choice question preceded judgment
(“Order B” questionnaire).
POPULATION
One hundred and two French university students participated
to the study (91 females, 22.6 ± 2.3 years old). After receiv-
ing oral information about the nature of the experiment, par-
ticipants completed two anonymous paper questionnaires, one
with the moral and non-moral dilemmas and one with the
Levenson items. Questionnaires were freely available at the end
of a course. Students were free to bring them back later, anony-
mously, at a dedicated place. They were informed that by
accepting to bring anonymously the questionnaires back, they
gave their informed consent to participate. Half of the sub-
jects completed a questionnaire “Order A” in which the judg-
ment question preceded the choice question. The other half of
each population completed a questionnaire “Order B” in which
the choice question preceded the judgment question. The two
groups had similar age, gender and LSRP psychopathy score
(cf. Table 1).
1Our study is not immune to a usual critique that can be raised in this kind
of setting involving moral dilemmas: what we consider here as an action is
obviously what the participants think their action could be if they were to
make the decision in real life. For ethical reasons, using questionnaires is as
far as we can go given the life and death nature of the dilemmas.
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Table 1 | Participant characteristics based on the type of questionnaire (judgment/choice vs. choice/judgment).
Order A questionnaire Order B questionnaire
judgment/choice (n = 51) choice/judgment (n = 51)
Mn SD Mn SD
Female gender, n (%) 47 (92%) 44 (86%) p = 0.525 X 2 = 0.92
Age 22.96 2.27 22.22 2.19 p = 0.095 t = −1.69
LSRP1 28.61 5.45 29.51 5.42 p = 0.404 t = 0.84
LSRP2 20.55 3.49 19.71 3.33 p = 0.215 t = −1.25
LSRP 49.16 7.95 49.22 8.1 p = 0.971 t = 0.04
Both groups are identical for studied variables (NS, no significant statistical difference; Mn, mean; SD, standard deviation; LSRP, Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy
scale).
The whole population showed an average total LSRP score
of 49.19 (±7.98), an average LSRP1 score of 29.06 (±5.43), and
an average LSRP2 score of 20.13 (±3.42). The two factors of
psychopathy were significantly correlated (r = 0.613, p < 0.001).
It is important to emphasize that in the present study we
examine psychopathy as a personality trait that varies within the
normal population.
We studied the influence of the level of psychopathic traits on
the probability of utilitarian responses to the judgment and choice
questions.
STATISTICS
For non-moral dilemmas, “appropriate” and “inappropriate”
responses were coded 1 and 0, respectively. For moral dilemmas,
response to each question was coded 1 if it favored maximizing
the good ofmore people at the expense of very few identified indi-
viduals (“utilitarian” response; e.g., sacrificing one person’s life to
save five), and 0 for the reverse situation.
All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 17.0 (SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL). For univariate comparisons, we used Student’s
t-test for the means and a Chi-squared test for the percentages.
Multiple logistic regression analyses fitted with the generalized
estimating equations method to account for the within-subject
correlation (Koenigs et al., 2007) were conducted using each
response to a dilemma as the dependent variable and entering
total psychopathy score, sex, affective proximity of the victim, and
the type of questionnaire as predictors. Sex was entered as control
variable in all analyses because it has been reported to signifi-
cantly influence moral decision making (Fumagalli et al., 2010).
An additional regression was conducted in which both factors
of psychopathy (LSRP1 and LSRP2) were simultaneously entered
as predictors in place of the total psychopathy score. When the
level of psychopathic traits had a significant effect, first order
interaction between this level and other potential predictors were
systematically studied.
RESULTS
INFLUENCE OF STUDIED VARIABLES, ON NON-MORAL DILEMMA
EVALUATION
No variable significantly predicted responses to non-moral dilem-
mas either for the judgment or the choice question. Psychopathy
traits thus do not influence response in easy non-moral decision
making situations.
Table 2 | Regression analyses demonstrating associations between
utilitarian responses to moral dilemma and predictors.
Judgement question Choice question
Predictors β-values p β-values p
Male sex 0.58 0.017 0.57 0.019
Affective proximity −0.08 0.470 −1.11 <0.001
Order of question 0.03 0.869 −0.01 0.964
Total psychopathy 0.01 0.945 0.19 0.048
*LSRP1 0.09 0.601 0.40 0.029
*LSRP2 −0.15 0.603 −0.18 0.534
Note: The beta values are from multiple regression models predicting utilitarian
response to moral dilemma from total psychopathy score (per 10-point increase),
sex, affective proximity of the victim, and the type of questionnaire. Numbers
indicate standardized beta (β). *Beta values for the LSRP1 and LSRP2 are from
multiple regression models using sex, affective proximity, type of questionnaire,
and both psychopathy factors (per 10-point increase) as predictors. Bold style is
for the variables of interest.
INFLUENCE OF STUDIED VARIABLES ON MORAL DILEMMA
EVALUATION
In the case of moral dilemmas, a high level of psychopathy
traits, male sex, and affective distance with the victim signifi-
cantly predicted utilitarian response to the choice question. For
the judgment question, only the male sex significantly predicted
utilitarian response, but neither the level of psychopathy traits nor
the affective distance with the victim.
Order of the question (judgment before choice or vice-versa)
did not influence the response for the judgment and for the choice
(cf. Table 2).
INFLUENCE OF BOTH FACTORS OF PSYCHOPATHY ON DILEMMA
EVALUATION
Only higher LSRP1 (affective and interpersonal dimension) score
significantly predicted a bias toward utilitarian response to the
choice question (cf. Table 2).
INFLUENCE OF INTERACTION BETWEEN PSYCHOPATHY TRAITS AND
OTHER SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS
We did not find any interaction with total psychopathy traits
(∗sex β = 0.18; p = 0.532; ∗affective proximity β = −0.14;
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p = 0.370) or LRSP1 (∗sex β = 0.22; p = 0.742; ∗affective
proximity β = −0.16; p = 0.388) that significantly predicted
utilitarian responses to the choice question. Increasing affective
proximity of the victim (i.e., stronger personal consequences) did
not interact with psychopathy traits’ influence on moral choice
responses.
DISCUSSION
A high level of psychopathy traits does not predict utilitarian
judgment during moral dilemmas evaluation, but it predicts util-
itarian response in the case of choice. This effect is observed more
specifically for the interpersonal-affective characteristics of psy-
chopathy as measured by the LSRP1. This suggests that while
the evaluative moral judgment of individuals with a high level
of psychopathic traits (HP) remains identical to the judgment
of individuals with normal/low level of psychopathic traits, they
are more likely to make an effective choice decision that would
inflict suffering or death to an individual for the greater wel-
fare of more people. A high level of psychopathic traits thus
influences the choice of hypothetical action endorsement embed-
ded in a moral dilemma, but not moral judgment. Consistent
with what is known in the case of patients with VMPFc lesions
who exhibit emotional deficits and endorse utilitarian responses
to moral dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007), we found that, in
non-clinical individuals, scoring higher on a general measure of
psychopathic traits and a measure of psychopathic traits targeting
shallow affects and VMPFc hypofunctioning (Lotze et al., 2007)
predicts utilitarian action endorsement preferences.
This may help explain the discrepant results of previous stud-
ies on moral dilemma evaluation in psychopathic individuals.
Some studies indeed claimed that the ability to evaluate moral
dilemmas is preserved in psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010), while
others claimed that this ability is altered (Koenigs et al., 2012).
Several factors are potentially responsible for this variability. It has
been proposed that differences in the population from which the
subjects were drawn may explain the discrepancy between these
studies as most studies have sampled directly from a psychiatric
population or a population of criminal offenders. Individuals
diagnosed with psychopathy may be highly motivated to report in
a manner that they believe will make them seem like an “average”
individual because, among other reasons, they may be concerned
that their responses may have consequences for their treatment or
incarceration (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011). Another potential fac-
tor is the scale used to measure psychopathy (Koenigs et al., 2011).
However, in the present study we used a scale that has been used
in previous studies on moral decision making (Glenn et al., 2010)
and shows a good concordance with the PCL-R (Brinkley et al.,
2001) and SRPIII scales (Williams et al., 2003) used in other stud-
ies on moral evaluation in psychopathy (Cima et al., 2010; Bartels
and Pizarro, 2011).
On the basis of our results, we propose that some discrepan-
cies in the results of previous studies could originate from the
use of moral dilemmas that differ on other dimensions, includ-
ing the wording or structure of the evaluation question (O’Neill
and Petrinovich, 1998; O’Hara et al., 2010), which may mod-
ify responses because they do not target the same evaluative
psychological processes. Indeed, if one goes into details of the
experimental procedures, responses were unaltered only when the
question was worded as an evaluative judgment (“Is it moral for
you to . . . ”) (Cima et al., 2010). By contrast, psychopaths showed
an altered response when the question was worded as a behav-
ioral choice (“Would you . . . in order to . . . ?”) (Bartels and Pizarro,
2011; Koenigs et al., 2012). At the cerebral level right dorso-lateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFc) disruption alters moral judgment but
not choice, which suggest that this structure is required to process
allocentric integration of contextual information during moral
judgment (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005; Tassy et al., 2012).
On the contrary, a high level of psychopathy traits characterized
by VMPFc dysfunction (Blair, 2007; Lotze et al., 2007; Koenigs,
2012), alters moral choice but not moral judgment. This sug-
gests that moral choice of action mostly involves VMPFc. In
the same line, Glenn et al. (2009) found that higher psychopa-
thy scores are associated with reduced activity in VMPFc during
moral choice of action (“Would you . . . in order to”). By contrast,
as previously hypothesized (Tassy et al., 2009). The same study
reported that higher psychopathy scores are also associated with
increased activity in the rDLPFc during moral dilemma resolu-
tion. Individuals with a high level of psychopathic traits, because
they lack some emotional reactions (Blair, 2007), may thus rely on
allocentric judgment of the situation to make a choice decision.
As expected from results of previous psychological studies,
affective proximity of the potential victims influences responses
toward less utilitarianism (O’Neill and Petrinovich, 1998; Thomas
et al., 2011). This is true for both judgment and choice, but seems
to be stronger for the choice [β choice = 1.11, 95% confidence
interval (0.87; 1.35) > β judgment = 0.01 (−0.14; 0.30)], which
is coherent with recent studies (Kurzban et al., 2012; Tassy et al.,
2013). A potential explanation could be that implication of a kin
has strong personal consequences (Thomas et al., 2011), and per-
sonal consequences influence more action choice than abstract
judgment (Sood and Forehand, 2005). We didn’t find any inter-
action between level of psychopathy traits’ influence and affective
proximity. The response bias toward more utilitarianism of indi-
viduals with higher level of psychopathic traits is not influence
by the affective proximity of the victim. It thus suggests that
the response bias toward more utilitarianism of individuals with
higher level of psychopathic traits is not influence by stronger
personal consequences. This may appear opposite to selfishness
theoretically associated with psychopathy (Campbell et al., 2009).
A reason should be that psychopathy results from a strong default
of emotional reaction to other distress. The distress of others
emotionally arouses individuals with a low level of psychopa-
thy traits. When the other is affectively proximate it potentiates
this reaction. It results in decreased utilitarianism in responses
(to reduce other’s distress). Individuals with high level of psy-
chopathic traits lack emotional reaction to the distress of others
(Lotze et al., 2007), thus this reaction cannot be potentiated.
As emphasized by Sood and Forehand (Sood and Forehand,
2005), compared to judgment, choice elicits a greater degree
of self-referent processing. Choice differs from judgment in
agency because it implies projecting oneself into a situation of
direct interaction using an egocentric frame of reference with
potential self-relevant consequences. It thus generates strong
emotional reactions and is also largely influenced by self-interest
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rational maximization. By contrast, judgment relies on an eval-
uation of the situation from a more allocentric perspective as
defined by Frith and de Vignemont (Frith and de Vignemont,
2005). It is thus less influenced by self-interest maximiza-
tion. Responses during moral dilemma evaluation indeed differ
depending on whether evaluators are agents in the scenario
rather than observers (Nadelhoffer and Feltz, 2008) and partic-
ipants’ intuition about their own or other’s moral transgression
activate distinct brain regions (Berthoz et al., 2006). It may
explain the variation of the degree of utilitarianism in various
dilemma responses where the dilemma induces an abstract judg-
ment (reaction to moral violation by another person) or a choice
of action (i.e., from a first person perspective) (Monin et al.,
2007). This could also explain why some studies reported that
people acknowledge moral norms and make appropriate moral
judgment but fail to act in accordance with them, illustrating a
capacity for “moral hypocrisy” (Batson et al., 1997).
Such a discrepancy was already noted in the field of develop-
mental psychology (Blasi, 1980). In line with such a view, the
results from the present study give further original experimen-
tal support to the notion that choice and judgment during moral
dilemma evaluation are partially distinct psychological processes
(Tassy et al., 2012). In itself, this may be sufficient to raise a
methodological concern in the study of moral cognition, and pro-
pose that choice of action and evaluative judgment should be
conceptualized and tested separately. It would help understand-
ing exactly which moral processes are affected in psychopathy,
and could be used as a tool to test potential therapeutic effect
(Krueger et al., 2012). More generally, it would improve in-depth
understanding of moral motivation and cognition.
Overall, our empirical data nourish the debate on the role
of our emotions and feelings about particular actions and out-
comes as a source of our moral judgment and moral behavior
(Moll et al., 2005, 2007; Shenhav and Greene, 2010) by reveal-
ing different patterns of moral evaluation in HP compared to
Control normal population individuals, at least for a particular
type of decision. Besides this, it brings a potential methodological
answer to the variability observed in previous studies exploring
moral evaluation in psychopathy. Overall, it highlights the fact
that moral cognition consists of many levels of complexity that
need to be better understood and taken into account.
FUNDING
No current external funding sources for this study.
REFERENCES
Bartels, D. M., and Pizarro, D.
A. (2011). The mismeasure
of morals: antisocial person-
ality traits predict utilitarian
responses to moral dilemmas.
Cognition 121, 154–161. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.010
Batson, C. D., Kobrynowicz, D.,
Dinnerstein, J. L., Kampf, H. C.,
and Wilson, A. D. (1997). In a
very different voice: unmasking
moral hypocrisy. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 72, 1335. doi: 10.1037/
0022-3514.72.6.1335
Berthoz, S., Grezes, J., Armony, J. L.,
Passingham, R. E., and Dolan,
R. J. (2006). Affective response
to one’s own moral violations.
Neuroimage 31, 945–950. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.039
Blair, R. J. (1995). A cognitive
developmental approach to
mortality: investigating the psy-
chopath. Cognition 57, 1–29. doi:
10.1016/0010-0277(95)00676-P
Blair, R. J. (2007). The amygdala
and ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex in morality and psychopathy.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 387–392. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2007.07.003
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral
cognition and moral action: a
critical review of the literature.
Psychol. Bull. 88, 1 45. doi: 10.1037/
0033-2909.88.1.1
Brinkley, C. A., Schmitt, W. A., Smith,
S. S., and Newman, J. P. (2001).
Construct validation of a self-report
psychopathy scale: does Levenson’s
self-report psychopathy scale
measure the same constructs as
Hare’s psychopathy checklist-
revised? Pers. Individ. Dif. 31,
1021–1038. doi: 10.1016/S0191-
8869(00)00178-1
Campbell, M. A., Doucette, N. L.,
and French, S. (2009). Validity
and stability of the youth psycho-
pathic traits inventory in a non-
forensic sample of young adults.
J. Pers. Assess. 91, 584–592. doi:
10.1080/00223890903228679
Chabrol, H., and Leichsenring, F.
(2006). Borderline personality
organization and psychopathic
traits in nonclinical adolescents:
relationships of identity diffusion,
primitive defense mechanisms
and reality testing with callous-
ness and impulsivity traits. Bull.
Menninger Clin. 70, 160–170. doi:
10.1521/bumc.2006.70.2.160
Cima, M., Tonnaer, F., and Hauser, M.
D. (2010). Psychopaths know right
from wrong but don’t care. Soc.
Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 5, 59–67. doi:
10.1093/scan/nsp051
Cleckley, H. (1941). TheMask of Sanity.
St. Louis, MO: CV Mosby.
Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M.
D., and Robbins, T. W. (2010).
Serotonin selectively influences
moral judgment and behav-
ior through effects on harm
aversion. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 107, 17433–17438. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1009396107
Edens, J. F., Marcus, D. K., Lilienfeld, S.
O., and Poythress, N. G. Jr. (2006).
Psychopathic, not psychopath: tax-
ometric evidence for the dimen-
sional structure of psychopathy. J.
Abnorm. Psychol. 115, 131–144. doi:
10.1037/0021-843X.115.1.131
Eslinger, P. J., and Damasio, A. R.
(1985). Severe disturbance of
higher cognition after bilateral
frontal lobe ablation: patient EVR.
Neurology 35, 1731–1741. doi:
10.1212/WNL.35.12.1731
Frith, U., and de Vignemont, F.
(2005). Egocentrism, allocen-
trism, and Asperger syndrome.
Conscious. Cogn. 14, 719–738. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.006
Fumagalli, M., Ferrucci, R., Mameli,
F., Marceglia, S., Mrakic-Sposta, S.,
Zago, S., et al. (2010). Gender-
related differences in moral judg-
ments. Cogn. Process. 11, 219–226.
doi: 10.1007/s10339-009-0335-2
Glenn, A. L., Koleva, S., Iyer, R.,
Graham, J., and Ditto, P. H. (2010).
Moral identity in psychopathy.
Judgm. Decis. Mak. 5, 497–505.
Glenn, A. L., Raine, A., and Schug,
R. A. (2009). The neural correlates
of moral decision-making in psy-
chopathy. Mol. Psychiatry 14, 5–6.
doi: 10.1038/mp.2008.104
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A.,
Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E.,
and Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive
load selectively interferes with
utilitarian moral judgment.
Cognition 107, 1144–1154. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell,
A. D., Darley, J. M., and Cohen, J.
D. (2004). The neural bases of cog-
nitive conflict and control in moral
judgment. Neuron 44, 389–400. doi:
org/10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B.,
Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., and
Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI
investigation of emotional engage-
ment in moral judgment. Science
293, 2105–2108. doi: 10.1126/sci-
ence.1062872
Hare, R. D. (1999). Without Conscience:
The Disturbing World of the
Psychopaths Among Us. New York,
NY: The Guilford Press.
Hare, R. D., and Neumann, C. S.
(2005). Structural models of psy-
chopathy. Curr. Psychiatry Rep.
7, 57–64. doi: 10.1007/s11920-
005-0026-3
Karpman, B. (1946). Psychopathy in
the scheme of human typology.
J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 103, 276–288.
doi: 10.1097/00005053-194603000-
00007
Koenigs, M. (2012). The role of pre-
frontal cortex in psychopathy.
Rev. Neurosci. 23, 253–262. doi:
10.1515/revneuro-2012-0036
Koenigs, M., Baskin-Sommers, A.,
Zeier, J., and Newman, J. P. (2011).
Investigating the neural correlates
of psychopathy: a critical review.
Mol. Psychiatry 16, 792–799. doi:
10.1038/mp.2010.124
Koenigs, M., Kruepke, M., Zeier, J., and
Newman, J. P. (2012). Utilitarian
moral judgment in psychopathy.
Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7,
708–714. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr048
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 229 | 5
–
Tassy et al. Moral evaluation in psychopathy
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R.,
Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser,
M., et al. (2007). Damage to the
prefrontal cortex increases utilitar-
ian moral judgements. Nature 446,
908–911. doi: 10.1038/nature05631
Krueger, F., Parasuraman, R., Moody,
L., Twieg, P., de Visser, E., McCabe,
K., et al. (2012). Oxytocin selectively
increases perceptions of harm for
victims but not the desire to pun-
ish offenders of criminal offenses.
Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. doi:
10.1093/scan/nss026. (in press).
Kurzban, R., DeScioli, P., and Fein,
D. (2012). Hamilton vs. Kant:
pitting adaptations for altru-
ism against adaptations for
moral judgment. Evol. Hum.
Behav. 33, 323–333. doi: 10.1016/
j.evolhumbehav.2011.11.002
Levenson, M. R., Kiehl, K. A., and
Fitzpatrick, C. M. (1995). Assessing
psychopathic attributes in a non-
institutionalized population. J.
Pers. Soc. Psychol. 68, 151–158. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.68.1.151
Lilienfeld, S. O., and Andrews, B. P.
(1996). Development and prelim-
inary validation of a self-report
measure of psychopathic per-
sonality traits in noncriminal
populations. J. Pers. Assess. 66,
488–524. doi: 10.1207/s1532
7752jpa6603_3
Lotze, M., Veit, R., Anders, S., and
Birbaumer, N. (2007). Evidence
for a different role of the ven-
tral and dorsal medial prefrontal
cortex for social reactive aggres-
sion: an interactive fMRI study.
Neuroimage 34, 470–478. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.09.028
Mokros, A., Menner, B., Eisenbarth,
H., Alpers, G. W., Lange, K.
W., and Osterheider, M. (2008).
Diminished cooperativeness
of psychopaths in a prisoner’s
dilemma game yields higher
rewards. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 117,
406. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.117.
2.406
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Garrido,
G. J., Bramati, I. E., Caparelli-
Daquer, E. M., Paiva, M. L., et al.
(2007). The self as a moral agent:
linking the neural bases of social
agency and moral sensitivity.
Soc. Neurosci. 2, 336–352. doi:
10.1080/17470910701392024
Moll, J., Zahn, R., de Oliveira-Souza,
R., Krueger, F., and Grafman, J.
(2005). Opinion: the neural basis of
human moral cognition. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 6, 799–809. doi: 10.1038/
nrn1768
Monin, B., Pizarro, D. A., and Beer, J.
S. (2007). Deciding versus reacting:
conceptions of moral judgment and
the reason-affect debate. Rev. Gen.
Psychol. 11, 99. doi: 10.1037/1089-
2680.11.2.99
Nadelhoffer, T., and Feltz, A. (2008).
The actor–observer bias and
moral intuitions: adding fuel
to Sinnott-Armstrong’s fire.
Neuroethics 1, 133–144. doi:
10.1007/s12152-008-9015-7
O’Hara, R. E., Sinnott-Armstrong,
W., and Sinnott-Armstrong, N. A.
(2010). Wording effects in moral
judgments. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 5,
547–554.
O’Neill, P., and Petrinovich, L. (1998).
A preliminary cross-cultural study
of moral intuitions. Evol. Hum.
Behav. 19, 349–367. doi: 10.1016/
S1090-5138(98)00030-0
Shenhav, A., and Greene, J. D. (2010).
Moral judgments recruit domain-
general valuation mechanisms
to integrate representations
of probability and magni-
tude. Neuron 67, 667–677. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2010.07.020
Sood, S., and Forehand, M. (2005).
On self-referencing differences
in judgment and choice. Organ.
Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 98,
144–154. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.
2005.05.005
Tassy, S., Oullier, O., Cermolacce,
M., and Wicker, B. (2009). Do
psychopathic patients use their
DLPFC when making decisions in
moral dilemmas? Mol. Psychiatry
14, 908–909; author reply: 909–911.
doi: 10.1038/mp.2009.71
Tassy, S., Oullier, O., Duclos,
Y., Coulon, O., Mancini, J.,
Deruelle, C., et al. (2012).
Disrupting the right prefrontal
cortex alters moral judgement.
Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7,
282–288. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr008
Tassy, S., Oullier, O., Mancini, J., and
Wicker, B. (2013). Discrepancies
between judgment and choice
of action in moral dilemmas.
Front. Cogn. Sci. 4:250. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00250
Thomas, B. C., Croft, K. E., and
Tranel, D. (2011). Harming kin
to save strangers: further evi-
dence for abnormally utilitarian
moral judgments after ventrome-
dial prefrontal damage. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 23, 2186–2196. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2010.21591
Walton, K. E., Roberts, B. W., Krueger,
R. F., Blonigen, D. M., and
Hicks, B. M. (2008). Capturing
abnormal personality with nor-
mal personality inventories: an
item response theory approach.
J. Pers. 76, 1623–1648. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00533.x
Williams, K. M., Nathanson, C.,
and Paulhus, D. L. (2003).
“Structure and validity of the
self-report psychopathy scale-III
in normal populations,” in 111th
annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association (Toronto,
ON).
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 28 February 2013; accepted:
13 May 2013; published online: 04 June
2013.
Citation: Tassy S, Deruelle C, Mancini
J, Leistedt S and Wicker B (2013) High
levels of psychopathic traits alters moral
choice but not moral judgment. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 7:229. doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2013.00229
Copyright © 2013 Tassy, Deruelle,
Mancini, Leistedt and Wicker. This is
an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in other
forums, provided the original authors
and source are credited and subject to
any copyright notices concerning any
third-party graphics etc.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 229 | 6
